January, 193i

ANNOUNCEMENT
The REmv takes pleasure in announcing the election of the following
members of the Third Year Class to the Editorial Board: Preston B. Davis,
T. Burns Drum, Natt M. Emery, Nathan Lavine, Daniel Lowenthal, Morris C.
Solomon, and Allen C. Thomas.

NOTES
THE STATUS OF AN EARLIER WILL AFTER REvoCATION OF A

LATER ONE-Probably the first approximation of the problem to
be considered developed in Cole v. Mordazunt ' in 1675 when the witnesses to a nuncupation, that would have superseded an earlier will,
proved to be perjurors. Lord Nottingham, in denying an application
for review, said: "I hope to see one day a law, that 'no written will
should be revoked but by writing.'" The very next year saw the
passage of the Statute of Frauds, 2 and Lord Nottingham had the
satisfaction of playing an important part in the framing of it.? The
circumstances of this case, more than two hundred and fifty years
ago, are still instructive when dealing with any of our Statutes of
Frauds, for these all derive, directly or indirectly, from the English
statute and are all designed to meet the same problem. The same
observation applies to our Wills Acts, the logical progeny of the Statute of Frauds and, perhaps, even more forcibly, for in the case of
wills, perjury is both easier than with other instruments, and, usually,
more tempting.
In Ford's Estate,4 arising under the Pennsylvania Wills Act
of 1917 ' which provides for revocation, inter alia, "by some will or
codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same, executed and
proved" ' by "the oaths or affirmations of two or more competent
witnesses," 7 three wills concern us. The first was duly executed in
1924 and remains intact; of the second, executed in 1926, only a carbon copy remains; the third was executed in 1927, and five days before the decedent's death was torn aninto revocandi. The 1926 and
1927 wills each contain clauses expressly revoking all prior wills.
The 1926 copy was denied probate on the legal presumption that,
See
"Stated in a note to Matthews v. Warner, 4 Ves. Jr., at 196 (798).
also the learned article of Professor Reppy, The History of the Law of Wills
and Testaments in England (1928) i6 GEO. L. REV. 194, at 201.
229 CAR. II. c. 3 (1676).
3 See Hening, The Origonal Drafts of the Statute of Frauds and Their
Authors (1913) 61 U. OF P. L. REv. 283.
'3o Pa. 183. 15I Atl. 789 (193o).
'Act of June 7, 19 1,, -. L. 403.

aIbid., § 20.
'Ibid., § 2. § 20 reads "proved in the manner hereinbefore provided"; the
reference is to § 2.
(325)
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the original not being discoverable, it was destroyed by the decedent
animo revocandi' The 1927 will was denied probate on actual proof
of such destruction. The contest in the instant case devolves on the
question whether the circumstances show a conclusive revocation of
the 1924 will with a resultant intestacy, or whether that will survives and is probatable. If the former, decedent's son would succeed as sole heir; if the latter, the major portion of the estate would
go to the establishment of a school.
Apart from the revocatory clauses referred to, the following
factors received consideration in the opinion: the decedent's advanced
age and firmness of character; the inconstancy of his testamentary
plans (he bad made no less than seven wills in his declining years);
an estrangement between him and his son, and a revival of the
father's affections for his son after the execution of his 1926 will;
the fact that the 1924 will had been in a trust company safe-deposit
box ever since its execution, and that decedent had apparently forgot
about it when he executed the 1927 will; and finally, and most importantly, the circumstances attending the revocation of the 1927
will. Five days before his death, decedent being very ill, directed
his secretary to get the 1927 will. This being done he tore it himself
and directed his secretary to tear it further, saying to the latter:
"Tell Leighton he is all I've got." Thereafter the secretary "gathered up the pieces from the bed, put them in an envelope, and placed
it in the bureau drawer . . . " It was held that the decedent died
intestate.
The court considers the following argument of the proponent
of the 1924 will: "If at the time the testator tore the 1927 will he had
said 'I intend also to revoke the 1924 will . . .and all other wills
and to die intestate,' this, under the statute, could not have operated
to revoke the 1924 will." "If such were the undisputed fact," the
court says, "and such had to be the result, its injustice would be
shocking." They continue:
. "The answer is that we are not dealing with an oral revocation alone but with written revocations admittedly signed by the
testator, which the appellee admits would be valid if the documents were probatable wills, but which its counsel argues are
not efficacious because neither of them actually became the will
of the decedent. . . . The statute however, does not limit
revocation to 'some other will,' but opens the door to 'other writing,' and does not say this 'other writing' may not be an ineffective will, so long as it appears, as it does here, that the testator
signed it . . . Alone the oral declarations would not suffice,
but coupled with the two undisputed writings, they do." '
On the authority of Bates' Estate, 286 Pa. 583, 134 At. 513 (1926).
'Supra note 4, at 194, i5i At. at 793.

NOTES

Lawson v. Morrison10 and Boudinot v. Bradford,"- both decided while the Wills Act of 1705 12 was in effect (but only the former mentioning it), are the earliest Pennsylvania cases dealing with
the problem. The revocation provision in the act related only to
personalty and required that the decedent's words be reduced to writing within his lifetime, the writing to be allowed by the decedent and
proved by two or more witnesses. 13 In the former case the court
said that the testatrix herself being presumed to have destroyed the
second will, the "first will is not thereby revoked, as neither could
be complete until the death of the testatrix, and her destroying it had
the same effect as if it had never been executed unless it had been
clearly proved that she did it with an intent to die intestate . .. ."
(The last clause is perhaps dictum but noteworthy for its frequent
repetition and its later effect in ruling a number of cases.' 4 )
The next case of importance was Flintham v. Bradford,15 in
1848, apparently decided without reference to statute.' 6 The issue
was whether defendant's claim under a will of 1821, which was "revoked by a will made in 1824", could be sustained. The latter was
revoked by being marked "cancelled". Extrinsic circumstances indicating an intention to die intestate were rejected as improper evidence and the claim under the 1821 will sustained. The decision, it
seems, was founded entirely on the ambulatory nature of a will, and
its incapability of having even a revocatory effect before its maker's
death.
Following these was a group of cases decided between 1907 and
1913, all controlled by an act 11 substantially similar to the Act of
1917 SO far as revocation is concerned. In Forquer's Estate 18 it was
not clear whether the alleged revocatory will was conditional or absolute. If conditional, however, it was clear that the possibility of the
condition had lapsed. After that lapse the decedent expressed his
satisfaction that he had left a will leaving everything to his wife.
Having said that this will was absolute and so probatable, the court
"02 Dall. 286 (Pa.
n"2

1792).

Dall. 266 (Pa. 1796).

In neither this nor the previous case did it appear
merely inconsistent

whether the later will contained an express revocation or was
with the earlier one.
"4 ANNE c. 16, § 14.

-Ibid., § 6.

" The dictum has been repeated as late as 1917, in WArolff's Estate, _26 Pa.

Dist. Rep. 144 (I917), where the revocation of the later will was held to revive
the first ipso facto (it not appearinz whether the former contained an express
revocation or not) and the court saying that this result necessarily follows
"unless the intention to die intestate is shown by competent evidence."
IO Pa. 82 (1848).
"The will the revocatory effect of which was in issue was made in 1824,

but was not offered for probate until long after the effective date of the Act of
1833, which is identical, so far as relates to the case, with that of 3917, supra}
note 5.
7 Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 249, §§ 6, 14.
10266 Pa. 331, 66 AtI. 92 (inq7).
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went on to say: "The evidence, however, .

.

.

is uncontradicted and

is sufficient to establish a republication of the will, and the will so
published is, we think, relieved of the contingency expressed therein,
the event having been passed."
In 19o9 the Superior Court decided Kerchner'sEstate,0 in which
the testatrix, having burnt the later of two wills, said, "The last will
shall count." Relying partly on Forquer'sEstate, the court held this
to be a valid republication.
In Manning's Estate 20 in 1911 the same court was confronted
with the converse situation and decided consistently. Testatrix, having had her latest will burnt at her direction, expressed the intention
of making a new one. An earlier will was denied probate, Forquer's
Estate being again invoked. It does not appear either here or in
the last case whether the destroyed will contained an express revocation clause.
The important things to note in the last two cases are, first, that
they involve a necessary implication that a later will revokes an earlier one, whether it contains an express revocation clause or is merely
inconsistent with it; and second, that the earlier will may be re-established by a parol "republication" although the Wills Act 21 says nothing about either publication, republication, or any other mode of reestablishing a revoked will.
In Holmes' Estate,-2 decided in 1913, the Supreme Court found
the evidence of a parol republication insufficient and refused to take
any position on either the necessity or the efficacy of a parol republication of a will where a later will had been revoked. The court
said, however, that the decision in Forquer's Estate bad been misunderstood in Kerchner's Estate and Manning's Estate; that the reference to republication was mere dictum.
Rudy v. Ulrick 23 involved an ineffective will offered as an "other
writing". The will here had been procured by undue influence, but
a special finding of the jury had established the fact that the revocation clause in the will was not so procured. In spite of this finding,
that clause was held inoperative. Referring to the "other writing"
provision of the act, the Supreme Court said: "It is implied that
this other writing is not a will, that is, an act of disposition or dec-"
laration of what a man intends as to his property after his death." 2
941 Pa. Super. 112 (19o9).
2'46 Pa. Super. 6o7 (2922). The court indicated some doubt as to whether
the proponent of the earlier will came by his possession of it regularly; showing
the disposition of a court to weigh the equities of the parties very seriously when
the law isindoubt. Such circumstances are often to be found in cases reaching
decisions not easily explainable under the law.
'Supra note 17.
"24o Pa. 537, 87 At. 778 (913).
"69 Pa. 177 (1871).
'Under § 13 and § 14 of the Act of 1833, supra note 17, which, as pointed
out, are essentially the same, for our purposes, as § 20 of the 1917 act, supra
note 5.

NOTES

Finally, there are two lower court decisions of the question
whether the revocation of the second will "revives" the first. One
holds that it does not, but that there must be a republication for
"revival". 21 The other holds that there is a "revival" "unless [which
wasn't the case on trial] testator had signified by some decisive act
a different intent." 20
That from the earliest times in the history of wills a will has
been considered revocable seems to be pretty well established.2 7 But
the status of a prior will, duly executed and in no way mutilated
anino revocandi,upon the execution of a subsequent will raises a different problem and one providing various solutions. The solutions
vary, moreover, not only between jurisdiction and jurisdiction, but, as
the Pennsylvania cases indicated, between court and court, and not
infrequently between the same court at one time and another. 2"
The cases themselves, indeed, often bristle with contradiction. 9
The problem stated has five possible solutions: that the earlier
will survives as a matter of law; that it survives unless an intention
to the contrary appears; that it does not survive unless an intention
" Stauffer v. Burholder, 2 Lanc. L. Rev. lO5 (Pa. I885).
-McCartan's Est., 58 Pitts. L. J. 364 (Pa. 1910).
-3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 540.
'The New Jersey cases may be considered, for example:
In Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 643 (i879), the revocation Lf the later
will was held to effect ipso facto a "revival" of the earlier.

In 1883, citing Randall v. Beatty, a New Jersey court held that the revoca-

tion of the later will created a presunption of the revival of the earlier. Will
of Seamen, 6 N. J. L. J. 2o (1883).
In I9O7 the court that decided Randall v. Beatty held, in the same situation,
that an intention not to "revive" the earlier will prevailed. The intention was
inferred from the fact that that will had been carelessly handled-"practically
thrown away'--and it was pointed out that in Randall v. Beatty it has been
carefully preserved. In re Moore's Will, 72 N. J. Eq. 371, 65 Atl. 447 (I907).
In In re Diament's Estate, 84 N. J. Eq. 135, 92 At.

952

(1915), aff'd, 88

N. J. Eq. 552, 1o3 At. igg (i918) the court returns to the ipso facto view of
Randall z,. Beatty, though the court speculates not a little on testator's intention.
Another example of what is meant may be seen in Connecticut where Whitehill v. Halbing, 98 Conn. 21, ix8 At. 454, 28 A. L. R. 895 (192) overrules
James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576 (1821), a leading case for the view that a revocation clause in a will has immediate operation. The writer says this in spite of
an attempt to base the distinction on an intervening statute; in this respect he
agrees with the minority of the court.
Consider, for example, the opening sentences of the opinion in James v.
Marvin, supra note 28, at 577: "If the will [the later will, that is] were in
existence, the clause of express revocation would, undoubtedly, revoke the prior
will. .
. The only enquiry before the court, is, whether the destruction of the
latter will containing the revoking clause, has revived the former." Thus the
court proceeds to the question of "revival" before it has determined that there
ever was a revocation.
Or the first sentence of the opinion in Bohanon v. Walcott, I How. 336
(Miss. 1836): "A will is ambulatory and has iw effect until the death of the
testator" (italics the writer's). Having said this, the court proceeds to hold
that a later will inconsistent with an earlier one revokes the latter immediately

upon execution.
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appears that it shall survive; that it does not survive unless there is a
republication of it; or that the entire question is one of intention
alone and there is no presumption either for or against survival. "
Each of these solutions is the law in some jurisdiction or other. Thus
the rule of Ecclesiastical Courts of England was "I that the question is entirely one of intention to be determined upon admissible
evidence.32 This view has found favor in a few American jurisdictions.3 3 On the other hand the rule of the common law courts of
England 34 was to the effect that revocation of the later will left the
earlier one to stand (or as some courts said, "revived" it). The rule
depends on the elementary principle that a will is ambulatory and can
have no effect whatsoever until its author dies. This view too has
its adherents among American jurisdictions, 35 but some have engrafted upon it the distinction that an express clause of revocation
is effective immediately upon the execution of the will containing it.*In England both rules disappeared with the passage of the Wills
Act of 18373' which requires a re-execution for the "revival" of a
analysis is taken from an excellent note to Whitehill v. Halbing,
28, in 28 A. L. R., at 91. The writer, however, substitutes the word
for "revival" there used, as not gratuitously implying an effective
and thus disposing of a large part of the problem.
I In 1857 the COURT OF PROBATE ACT, 20 & 21 VIcT. c. 77, placed jurisdiction
over wills and testaments in the Probate Court. REPPY, supra note I, at 395.
Moore v. De La Torre, i Phillim. Ece. Rep. 375, i6i Eng. Rep. ioi6
(i816); Hooton v. Head. 3 Phillim. Ecc. Rep. 25, 16i Eng. Rep. 1247 (1819);
'This
supra note
"survival"
revocation

Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Addams Ecc. Rep. 116, 162 Eng. Rep. 238 (1824). Contra
(that a presumption against "revival" prevails) : Helyar v. Helyar, i Lee Eccl.
Rep. 472, 161 Eng. Rep. 174 (1754).

In Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252 (i883),

a case devoid of indicative circumstances, the court professing to follow the
Ecclesiastical rule, presumed against "revival". See also Helyar v. Helyar,
stupra, holding similarly, though speaking of the necessity of a republication.
.Dawson v. Smith, 3 Houst. 92 (Del., 1865) ; Blackett v. Ziegler, 353 Iowa
344, 133 N. W. 9ol (1911) ; Pickens v. Davis, supra,note 32; Williams v. Miles,
68 Neb. 463, 96 N. W. 151 (19o3) ; Lane v. Hill, 6o N. H. 275 (1895) ; In re
Gould's Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 Atl. lo82 (19oo).

'This view is generally believed to have derived from Lord Mansfield's
decision in Goodright & Glazier v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 98 Eng. Rep. 317
(1770), in which it was not clear whether the later will was merely inconsistent
with the earlier one or contained an express revocation. The reports in Bull.
N. P., 266, and Lofft 575, indicate that there was an express clause of revocation.
'Whitehill v. Halbing, supra note 28; Schaeffer v. Voyle, 88 Fla. 170, 102
So. 7 (1924) ; Stetson v. Stetson, 200 II1. 6oi, 66 N. E. 262 (19o3) ; Cheever v.

North, io6 Mich. 39o, 64 N. W. 455 (1895) ; Diament's Estate, supra note 28;
Bates v. Hacking, 28 R. I. 523, 68 Atl. 622, aff'd (in a well-considered opinion)
29 R. I. I,68 Atl. 622 (19o8) ; Kollock v. Williams, 131 S. C. 352, 127 S. E. 444

(1925).

' For example Michigan; Cheever v. North, supra note 35, held that
there was a "revival" where the later will was merely inconsistent with the
earlier, whereas Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. W. 799 (i88i), held that
there was none where the revocation was express.
371 VicT. c. 26, § 22 reads: "No will or codicil, or any part thereof, which
shall be in any way revoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the re-execution
thereof, or by a codicil . . . showing an intention to revive the same; and

NOTES

will "in any way revoked". The "in any way revoked" provision includes, as held, 38 revocation by inconsistency. Three American states
have provisions substantially identical with the English.3 9 Eleven
others 4 provide that where "a second will" (presumably whether expressly revocatory or merely inconsistent with the first) is made and
later revoked, there is no "revival" of the first unless the "terms of
the revocation" show an intention to "revive" or unless the earlier
will is "duly republished." The "terms of the revocation" as held
in at least one state having this statute must be written and republication must be in the presence of witnesses."
Finally, there are two other groups of cases, not involving statutes: the one holding that an earlier will does not survive unless an
intention affirmatively appears that it shall; 42 the other holding that
a formal republication is prerequisite to survival (or, perhaps, "revival", in its strict sense, which necessarily presupposes a revocation) .43
The varietism set forth above no doubt arises from two considerations: first, that when a man makes will A, later makes will B,
which differs from A, and after revoking B, dies, he leaves a cloud
on the question whether he intended, by revoking B to give effect to
A; second, that neither the original Statute of Frauds nor -any statute modelled upon it provides in terms whether or not the later will
shall be given a revocatory effect immediately upon execution, or depend upon the death of the testator to achieve that effect.
Three rules may (one. indeed, necessarily will) involve an inquiry into the intent with which the testator revoked his later will.
So far as the decisions themselves go the cases are indistinguishable; only in their dicta do they differ. That is, when one court says
that the earlier will survives unless an intent appears that it shall not
survive, and another says that the earlier will is a nullity unless an
intent appears that it shall survive, it is in each case the independent
when any will or codicil which shall be partly revoked, and afterwards wholly

revoked, shall be revived, such revival shall not extend to so much thereof as

shall have been revoked before the revocation of the whole thereof, unless an
intention to the contrary shall be shown."
.Hodgkinson's Goods, [893] P. 339.
2 Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia. The reader may refer, for citations of statutes to the admirable article of Professor Bordwell, The Statute Law
of Wills (1928-1929) 14 IOWA L. REV. 1-35, 172-200. 283-310, 428-446.
Section XIII, "Republication and Revival" begins at 308. The statutes

referred to are at 308, n. 48r.

"0Ibid., and p. 309, n. 484 for the states.
"Matter of Stickney, 16i N. Y. 42, 55 N. E. 396 (1899).
'*Williams v. Williams, i42 Mass. 515, 8 N. E. 424 (1886) ; In re Moore's
Will, supra note 28.
3Lively v. Harwell, 29 Ga. 5o9 (1859), aff'd, 3o Ga. 315 (1859) ; Scott v.
Fink, supra note 41; Bohanon v. Walcot, supra note 29; In re Noon's Will, 153
Wis. 299, 91 N. AV. 670 (1902). See also Pennsylvania cases supra.notes 39
and 2o.
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clause of the court's statement that rules the case; the other is a supererogation not to be tested until the court meets with the situation
converse to that confronting it. Therefore, for our purposes the
cases decided under these rules, as well as those decided, apart from
statute, which require republication to "revive" the earlier will are
at one: the status of the earlier will in all of them depends on thel
testator's intention, whether formally or informally expressed.
However, there remain those cases 4 which hold clearly that
the earlier will is incapable of probate. There seem to be three independent reasons stated for this rule:
First: that where some of the modes of revocation in a Wills
Act, namely, the destructional modes, are immediate in their effect, it
is to be inferred that the others must be so also. The answer to this
seems to be that the immediate effect of revocation by a physical act
to the instrument is not provided for in any Wills Act or Statute
of Frauds extant; this construction probably found its way into the
decisions by reason of the eminently cogent reasoning supporting it.
If a man destroys or mutilates a will he must do so because he has
definitely decided that he can thus plainly show those who may be
later concerned with it that it no longer expresses his mind; indeed.
he attempts to wipe out all evidence that it ever did express his
mind. No such reasoning can support a similar result where a will
is physically preserved; here a reasonable man may well doubt what
the testator intended in regard to it.
Second: that if a revocatory clause is not given an immediate
effect, then it is given no effect at all, for even an inconsistent will
disposes of an earlier one upon the testator's death. Consequently
to give the statutory provision for revocation by a subsequent will,
codicil or other writing some scope of effectiveness, we must give
it an immediate effect. This argument carries more conviction, but
it clashes with an equally sound theoretical objection: vi7., the rule
that a will is for all purposes ambulatory.
Finally: an argument founded on the practical consideration that
the testator, by including an express revocation clause in his will must
intend that the earlier will shall be revoked. 4 ' And, the argument
continues,4" how can we know that by revoking the second, the testator intends to revert to the first? But we are not concerned with
ascertaining the intent of the testator by any evidence whatsoever. One
office of a Wills Act, obviously, is to fix a mode of ascertaining that
intent with a minimum of parol testimony.
This argument seems devoid of conviction. If the decedent had
clearly meant to revoke his earlier will for all time, he could easily
have done so by destroying or mutilating it. That he keeps it must
" Those in note 43, for example.
' "Most of the laity apparently believe that the express revocation clause
revokes the first will at once."

I PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) 718.

'0 Lumpkin, J., in Harwell v. Lively, supra note 43, at 320.

NOTES

indicate either that he has forgot about it or that he believes the
mere execution of the later instrument nullifies the earlier one. That
this is really believed is hard to credit. In its very nature, the
making of a will is something private, something secret. In none
but the 'eleven states requiring publication need a testator even make
it known that it is a will that he is executing.4 7 Yet the effectiveness
of the later will to revoke will depend entirely on knowledge of its
existence after the testator's death; and in the states holding only an
express revocation clause immediately effective, on knowledge of the
contents of the instrument, a thing the testator is never required to
make known. As to these facts, then, parol testimony will be introduced, if available. The temptation to perjury under these circumstances to dispose of an inconvenient will is obvious.
The rule discussed has no analogy, it is submitted, anywhere else
in the law.48
The rule, then, that a will revokes once and for all merely gives
effect to what a man says when he is, so to speak, talking to himself.
It rejects a validly executed instrument he leaves behind him because
he has in another and later one expressed a temporary dissatisfaction
with it; and this, in spite of the fact that this later one was itself,
nullified.
Carried to its logical conclusion this rule would demand that
even an inconsistent will should ipso facto nullify. This, obviously,
has all the attributes of a will containing an express revocation
clause: it is as effectual to dispose of the testator's property; it as
clearly expresses his dissatisfaction with his old will. One Texas
case seems to present the reductio ad absurdum of the rule. Here
the revocatory will was a contingent holographic one. The possibility
of the contingency had lapsed, yet the will was
4 held to have revoked an earlier will by its mere inconsistency. 0
The complementary phase of what has been said involves an
even more fundamental difficulty. Only in those cases where there
See Bordwell, supra note 39, at 14, and n. 54.
2 H. L. 296 (1866) [see i WImsTON, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1914) § 2MI], by which an intention to execute a sealed
instrument as an effective obligation was held to make it effective, is not entirely
the same. Here, in all probability, an actual delivery of the instrument will in
due course take place; it is in the nature of the transaction that it should; and
it is only in the exceptional case that it may not and that the fact of the existence
of an obligation will be locked up in the mind of the obligor. The very essence
'

'The rule of Xenos v. Wickham, L. R.

of a will, on the other hand, clearly makes continuance of its bare physical

existence uncertain.
So, too. an attempt at analogy by a distinguished writer [Roberts, Revival
of a PriorWill by Revocation of a Later Will (19oo) 48 Am. L. REG. 505, 518]
lacks point. This writer attempts to assimilate revocation by will to revocation
by a contract devising lands already included in a testamentary disposition. The
contract, in a case cited by him [Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (N. Y.
1823)1, was held to effect an immediate revocation. A contract creates a legal
obligation; it is something overt and legally cognizable; and if it does not clearly
show a revocatory intent, it certainly should; a will is clearly distinguishable.
'"Dougherty v. Holscheider, 4o Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S. W. 113 (1905).
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is some evidence that there was a later will, will the problem arise.
Yet in what proportion of cases will such evidence appear? No one
can say. And in how many of the cases in which it does appear,
is it reliable? Again the answer is problematical. Where no evidence appears for a number of years after probate of the earlier
will, we may have a distribution that the law would never have countenanced in the first instance and, which practically, it cannot, in many
cases, rectify in the second. Thus, when the question arises how
well the rule works,5" the answer must be that no one can tell.
In Ford'sEstate the court found that the revocation was effected
by "oral declarations . . . coupled with undisputed writings." If,
as the court concedes, the purpose of the Wills Act is to prevent parol
revocation,"- then it is hard to see how a revocation of which any
essential is an oral declaration can have any validity. Moreover, it
is very difficult to see by what logic an ineffective will may be considered another writing: no distinction appears in the statute between
the will as it appears before testator's death and the same will after
his death. How then can the former be considered another writing? But even if such a distinction could be inferred from the language of the act, the court would still have to meet the objection that
the will must be "proven . . . by the oaths or affirmations of two
or more witness." 52 This is the same provision that is made for
admission to probate. Whether the 1927 will might have been so
proved in this case or not, it does not appear as a fact that it was so
proved. Chief Justice Moschzisker, dissenting, takes the position
that the 1927 will could not have been so proved and so can have no
effect.
On all these grounds the case seems unsound. It is one of those
rare cases where the physically revoked instrument is as carefully
preserved as the prior untouched one, and like nearly all such cases
'To make the situation concrete, suppose a case arising in California where
the rule that a later will revokes an earlier one immediately has been crystallized
in CAI.. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 1297, even though the will be only inconsistent [§ 1296]. Having drafted three inconsistent testamentary plans with a
mind to ultimately destroying two of them in favor of the one he may finally
decide upon, testator in collaboration with his witnesses executes his plans as

wills. He does not take note of the order of execution. Later he destroys the
second and third wills executed, but does nothing to show "by the terms of
his revocatior" that he means the first to stand. While on the one hand the

testator's common sense tells him that the only will he allows to survive him
will be given effect, the California statute says that it is a nullity. And in Re
Johnston's Est., 188 Cal. 336, 206 Pac. 628 (i922) it was held that to establish
the inconsistency of the contents of either the second or third will all that is

necessary is the credited testimony of one witness. This, moreover, would be
enough to establish the untruth that the remaining will was the third executed;
or the untruth, if it was the third that did remain, that it was the first, and so

a nullity.

a Supranote 4, at 195, 151 AtI. at 793.
" Combining § 20 of the Act, supra note 5,which requires that the revocatory
instruments shall be proved "in the manner hereinbefore provided," and § 2,
which recites the manner referred to.
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decided on a rule of immediate revocation, it involves laborious speculation as to what the testator intended. Thus it violates not only
the letter of the Wills Act, but its inner spirit as well. In combining parol evidence and a written instrument to produce the revocatory effect, the case seems unique. It would have been much simpler, if the "proven" provision of the act was to be ignored, to hold
that the revocatory clause took effect as in a will and immediately
upon execution of the will.
Conclusion.
"No rule can be worked out which will avoid the dangers
of oral evidence on the one hand and which will give effect to
the actual intention of the testator in the particular case on the
other." "
It was this fact that induced the passage of the various statutes
of frauds, and later of the Wills Acts. These latter, obviously, are designed to fix a formal mode for the recording of testamentary intent.
Under them, parol evidence of such intent is meant to be excluded
as far as possible.54 The results of any violation of the spirit of
these acts, as the writer has attempted to show, are two: first, that
the result will probably not express the intent of the testator, who by
retaining intact the earlier instrument, has shown, first, that he entertained as a possibility the idea of re-adopting it, and later, by revoking the second will, that he intends such re-adoption; second, the complementary fact that the rule adopted will necessarily be incapable of
application in an indeterminate number of cases.
Perhaps the word "revival", with its implication of a former
nullification, is partly responsible for the rule of immediate revocation. The true situation is, simply, not that an earlier will is "revived" by the revocation of a later one, but that it stands because it
is the latest duly executed instrument setting forth the maker's testamentary plan. But more likely the motivating force behind the
rule lies in the regard of courts to the equities of a case and their
propensity toward giving them effect in spite of statutes; it may
even be, as one eminent jurist suggests, that judges bred on common
law traditions feel some obscure distrust of statutory law.55 But it
I PAGE, op. cit. supra note 45, at 719.
must be made, of course, for the animus testandi and the animus

' Allowance

revocandi.

6 "The truth is that many of us, bred in common law traditiuns, view statutes
with a distrust which we may deplore, but not deny. This has led, as you know,
to the maxim of construction that statutes derogating from the common law are
to be strictly construed, a maxim which recalls.what has been said by Sir Frederick Pollock of rules of statutory construction generally: they cannot well be
accounted for except on the theory that the legislature generally changes the
law for the worse, and that the business of judges is to keep the mischief of its
interference within the narrowest possible limits." CARDOZO, TIIE PARnOxEs OF
LEGAL SCIENCE (1928)

9.
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is more than questionable in the writer's mind whether the fruits of
this viewpoint have justified it; to the writer Cole v. Mordaunt seems
of more than antiquarian interest.
O.M.D.

EFFECT OF A DIRECTION BY A TESTATOR THAT SHARE DiviDENDS' BE CONSIDERED AS PRINCIPAL UNDER A STATUTE PROHIBITING ACCUMULATION OF INCOME-In Maris's Estate, a case recently

before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the testator provided in
the residuary clause of his will that the remainder of his estate should
be held in trust, the income to be paid to his widow during her life
with remainder to others at her death. The testator further provided that "all stock dividends consisting of shares of stock of the
corporations issuing them shall be considered as principal". The
court held that the provision that share dividends be considered as
principal was a direction for a void accumulation, and, therefore,
awarded the property to the life tenant.
This case presents three interesting questions of law: (I) What
are the rights of the life tenant and the remainderman to extraordinary corporate dividends and distributions? (2) Does a direction
that share dividends be considered as principal effect an illegal accumulation of income? (3) Granting that the direction is illegal, to
whom should the share dividends be awarded?
What are the rights of the life tenant and the rernaindermanto extraordinary corporate dividends and distributions?
Since this question has been written upon very extensively heretofore,' and since it is only indirectly raised here, a brief review of
existing principles will suffice for present purposes. There are three
well defined views as to the distribution of extraordinary dividends
between the life tenant and the remainderman. One minority view,
known as the Kentucky view, awards all dividends, without any dis'This

terminology is adopted from the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF

BUSINESS AssocIATIoNs (Am. L. Inst. 1928) Tentative Draft No. I.
8

,Ioi Pa. 2o, 151 Atl. 577 (1930).

Grimm, The Right to Dividends as Between Life Tenant andRentaindenman

(1925) 10 ST. Louis L. REV. 75; Thomas Reed Powell, Income From Corporate
Dividends (922)
35 HARV. L. REv. 363; Hale, Apportionent of Income
(1903) 16 HARV. L. REV. 404; Note (i93o) 44 HARv. L. REV. 10I; Note (193o)
18 CALIF. L. REv. 535; Note (1929) 28 MICH. L. REV. i88; Note (1929) 3 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 267; Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 589; Note (1926) 74
U. OF PA. L. REV. 618; Note (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 195; Note (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
774; Note (1912) 26 HARv. L. REV. 77; Note (1923) 24 A. L. R. 42 as amended
42 A. L. R. 451; Note (1927) 50 A. L. R. 376; Note (1928) 56
!z"
T1.. R. 1532; BALLENTINE, PRIVATE COR"-,,
PORATIONS (1927) pp. 539-545; 2 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) pp. 1936by Note (1926)

T..

i96o; EASTMAN, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA (2d ed. Supp. 1924)
§ 266; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) 912; 7 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 5378-5406.
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tinction between cash and share dividends, to the life beneficiary who
is entitled to the income when the dividends are declared regardless
of when the surplus was earned by the corporation.4 Another minority view, known as the Massachusetts view, awards all cash dividends
to the life tenant and all share dividends to the remainderman regardless of when the surplus was earned by the corporation.5 The Pennsylvania rule gives everything to the life tenant which rcpresents
profits of the corporation earned after the creation of the trust except
that sufficient is given to to the corpus to prevent its intact value from
depreciating below what it was when the trust was created.6
The Pennsylvania rule is generally conceded to be the majority
.\merican view.' The two minority views are admittedly rules of
convenience because of the practical difficulties involved in the appli'Robinson v. Robinson, 221 Ky. 245, 298 S. W. 701 (1927); DuPont v.
Peyton, 8 Del. Ch. 225, 136 At!. 149 (1927), (1927) 1I MINN. L. Rxv. 659.
Appeal of Harding, 149 At!. 846 (Conn. 193o) ; Jackson v. Maddox, 136
Ga. 31, 70 S. E. 865 (1911); DeKoven v. Alsop, 205 Ill. 3o9, 68 N. E. 930
(19o3) ; Thatcher v. Thatcher, 117 Me. 331, 104 Atl. 515 (i918), (1919) 3
MINN. L. REV. 2o4; Coolidge v. Grant, 251 Mass. 352, 146 N. E. 719 (1925);
i re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418,225 N. W. 878 (1929), (1929) 28 MIcH. L. REv.

468; Hayes v. St. Louis Union Co., 317 Mo. lO28, 218 S. W. 9i (1927), Note
(1928) 56 A. L. R. 1276; Humphrey v. Lang, x69 N. C. 6oi, 86 S. E. 526 (1915) ;
Lamb v. Lehmann, 1Io Ohio St 59, 143 N. E. 276 (1924); Security Trust Co.
v. Rammelsburg, 82 W. Va. 701, 97 S. E. 122 (1918).
'Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 133
At. 562 (1926); Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927), Note
('1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 589, which discusses the rights of the life tenant

and the remainderman prior to and including Nirdlinger's Estate. Since that
case was adjudicated the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has given five decisions

on questions related to the subject: Packer's Estate, 291 Pa. 194, 139 At. 867
(1927) ; Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 14o Atl. 862 (1928) ; Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 Atl. III (1929) ; Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147
AtI. 6o6 (i92g); Bard's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 148 Atl. 9o7 (193o), (1930) 30
COL. L. REv. 902. Only one of these cases presents any unusual problem and

that is Buist's Estate. There the trustee held shares in a national bank, which
merged with another national bank.

A statute gave any shareholder the right

to take cash or shares in the resulting bank. The trustee took the shares. The
life tenant claimed the trustee should have taken the cash so as to bring about
a distribution of the undivided earnings. The court decided against the life
tenant. A more liberal court might well have decided otherwise on the ground
that the trustee cannot be partial to either the life tenant of the remainderman,
and by accepting the shares he may have precluded the life tenant from ever
receiving the undivided profits. See PERRY, infra note 22.
7
1"n re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 375, 197 Pac. 9o (192), Note (1926)
T5 CALIF. L. REv. 66; In re Sherman Trust, 19o Iowa 1385, 179 N. W. lo9
(192o) ; Spedden v. Norton, i5o Atl. 15 (Md. 1930); Baldwin v. Baldwin, i5o
At!. 282 (Md. 1930); Goodwin v. McGaughy, io8 Minn. 248, 122 N. W. 6
(19o9) ; Simpson v. Millsaps, 80 Miss. 239, 31 So. 912 (19o2); Holbrook v.
Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 Atl. 124 (19o7) ; IHagedorn v. Arens, io6 N. J. Eq.
377,

15o

Atl. 4 (i93O) ; Plainfield Trust Co. v. Bowlby, 151 At!. 545 (N. J.

193o) ; Wallace v. Wallace, 90 S. C. 61, 72 S. E. 553 (1911) ; Pritchitt v. Trust

Co., 96 Tenn. 472, 36 S. W. io64 (1895) ; In re Heaton's Estate, 89 Vt. 550, 96
(I916) 29 HARv. L. REV. 55i; In re Jenkin's Estate, 199 Wis.
Atl. 21 (915),

131,

225

N. W. 733 01929).
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cation of the majority view. 8 The presence of these difficulties explains a tendency in recent years toward the minority views.9
Does a direction that share dividends be considered as principal effect
an illegal accumulation of income?
Accumulation of income is forbidden in most jurisdictions by
statute. Many ui ihe statutes are descendants of the Thelluson Act "
in England which was enacted after an estate had grown into undeBecause
sirable proportions through the accumulation of income."
the law on this question is statutory, it is most impractical to draw
analogies between states.
The Act of 1853 12 in Pennsylvania provides that income cannot
be accumulated for more than twenty-one years after the death of
the settlor, that is, only during the minority of the beneficiary, except for charitable gifts, and provided that a trustee can use income
for the maintenance and education of the minor.' 3 The direction of
the testator in Maris's Estate that share dividends should be considered as principal would cause those dividends to accumulate. When
the case reached the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania, the accumulation point was disposed of by the court when it said, ". . . , for no
one can be permitted to set aside the public policy of the State by the
simple expedient of designating by another name that which the
courts have repeatedly decided to be income." 14 It was the first time
a trust containing such a provision had ever reached the highest court
in Pennsylvania. 5 The conclusion reached was the only one that
could logically be arrived at provided the first premise, that is, that
share dividends are income, was sound. 6
Almost the same question as that involved in Maris's Estate
came before the New York Court of Appeals in 1928 in Equitable
Trust Company v. Prentice." In that case the trustee was given the
'John Lewis Evans, Calculating the Distribution of a Stock Dividend Betweet; Life Tenant and Corpus (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 981.
'Proposed Uniform Principal and Income Act adopts the so-called Massachusetts rule, (1929) Committee Reports pp. 152-169. For a discussion of the
Act see Clark, The Proposed Uniform Principaland Income Act (March, 1930)
50 TRUST COMPANIES 383. New York adopted a minority view by statute in
1926; see infra note 2o. The Governor of Pennsylvania on April I , 1929,
vetoed HousE BILL No. 1501, which made share dividends principal as between
life tenant and remainderman.
1039 & 4o GEo. III, c. 98 (18oo). The Act was passed in consequence of
the decision in Thelluson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227 (1798).

11

PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

(7th ed.

x929)

§ 394.

'Act of April 18, 3853, P. L. 503, § 9.
' For a discussion of the problems arising under the Act of 1853. see 4
PURDON, PENNSYLVANIA DIGEST OF STATUTES (13th ed. 191o) p. 4036.
" Supra note 2, at 23, 151 AtI. at 578 (i93O).
'A similar problem arose in Wentz's Estate, 12 Pa. D. & C. 398 (1928),
but the case did nnt reach the Supreme Court.
"'The decision of the court was anticipated in Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 589, 593.
"250 N. Y. I, 164 N. E. 723 (1928); (1929) 63 A. L. R. 263; (1929) 29
COL. L. REv. 843.
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privilege of allocating share dividends to principal rather than to income. The trustee exercised the privilege, and then brought an action
to determine whether such allocation would effect an unlawful accumulation. There was a statute in New York prohibiting the accuNew York at the time the controversy arose
mulation of income.'
followed the Pennsylvania rule governing the rights of the life tenant
and the remainderman when a corporation declares a share dividend.' 9

In 1926 New York adopted a new rule by statute,20 but that statute
was passed subsequent to the controversy in Equitable Trust Coinpany v. Prentice,2 1 and, therefore, was not applied in that case. The
Court of Appeals held that there was no unlawful accumulation. The
court argued that in reality share dividends merely dilute shares in
the corpus, and, therefore, are principal; that when they are given
to the life tenant, he is given part of the corpus to more nearly effect
the true intention of the testator.
Thus two courts of last resort in two leading states reach opposite conclusions on a similar problem. The testator evidently did
not include the provision that share dividends be considered as principal to evade the statute forbidding accumulations, but simply ordered
that what was probably his policy when dealing with his corporate
shares when living be continued after his death. Another reason
might have been to prevent litigation between the life tenant and the
.remainderman. This particular situation was certainly not in the legislators' minds when they enacted the statute against accumulations,
which was passed to prevent the accumulation of large estates and
the deprivation of the use of the money by lawful heirs for a long
period of time. There is little danger of those distasteful conditions
arising from the provision in Maris's Estate. It is true that another
testator may direct that all of his estate be invested exclusively in
corporations which pay only share dividends, but that is a different
situation. If such a case should ever arise, the court would not
necessarily be precluded from deciding that such a provision violated
the statute. Again the trustee may invest the estate in corporations
which declare only share dividends, but it is probable the life tenant
could prevent such action on the ground that the trustee cannot be
partial as between the life tenant and the remainderman."
The Pennsylvania court found, in the absence of any direction
by the testator, that share dividends were income and that, therefore,
the life tenant was entitled to them. Share dividends, having been
classified as income for that purpose, are given the attributes of that
NEw YoRx R. S. part II, c. IV, title 4, § 3; Revised but no change in

substance,

PERSONAL PROPERTY LAw,

§ I6.

" In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, io3 N. E. 723 (I913).
= N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1926) c. 42, § 17-a; N. Y. CoNs. LAws
ANN. (Cahill, 1926) c. 42, § i7-a provides that adding share dividends to the

corpus does not effect a void accumulation.
" See supra note 17.
221 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed.

1929)

§ 307.
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class for another purpose with what seems to be insufficient consideration of the possible desirability of treating them as principal for the
new purpose. The decision where the testator gave no direction
should not have precluded the court from reaching a different result
where the testator gave a direction. Possibly share dividends are
neither principal or income, but rather a kind of hybrid between the
two. It certainly appears more desirable when treating them in connection with the statute prohibiting accumulations, since no public
policy seems to be violated, to give share dividends the attributes of
principal.
Whatever the relative merits of the two results, it seems safe
to conclude that the decisions in the Pennsylvania and the New York
courts will lead the way along two opposing lines in other jurisdictions, other things being equal.
Granting that the direction is illegal, to whom should the share divi(lends be awarded?
Obviously this question will only arise in states which follow the
Pennsylvania decision. In other jurisdictions the share dividends will
be accumulated for the remainderman. The Act of 1853 23 in Pennsylvania provides that where there is a direction for illegal accumulation the property "shall go to and be received by such person or
persons as would have been entitled thereto if such accumulation had
not been directed". The court awarded the share dividends to the
life tenant in Mais's Estate by following the rules of distribution set
out in White's Estate,24 that is, "if the accumulation relates to a vested
interest, taking effect in possession, the released income goes at once
to the beneficiary of that interest; if to an interest not vested in possession. the income goes to the residuary legatee "unless the provision
is in the residuary clause in which case the income goes under the
intestate laws to the heirs". 2 " The court said that the life tenant
had a vested equitable interest and that such interest took effect in
possession at the death of the testator; that, therefore, the life tenant
was the person entitled to the income because she was the one who
would have taken if the testator had not given the illegal direction.
This decision reversed the lower court 26 which awarded the share
dividends to the heirs at law on the ground that since the direction
was in the residuary clause, the rules of White's Estate required that
such dividends be given to the heirs. The decision in Maris's Estate
cleared up much of the existing doubt as to distribution in Pennsylvania where a void accumulation is directed. The confusion was
probably due to a large number of cases in which the life tenant had
no right to immediate possession when the income became distributa'See
218

supra note 12.
Pa. Dist. R. 33 (1898).

See supra note 24, at 36. (Italics the writer's.)
"Maris's Estate, 12 Pa. D. & C. 783 (1928).
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ble,2 7 so that the reasons for awarding it to a particular person were
lost sight of.
The Supreme Court might have reached a different conclusion
in Maris's Estate, and this suggestion applies only to the situation
in that case, if it had not insisted so strongly upon the fact that share
dividends are income. It might well be argued that the testator did
not make an illegal direction by saying that share dividends should
be considered as principal but rather because he provided for their
accumulation. Deleting the illegal direction, that is, that share dividends should be accumulated, there remains a provision that share
dividends be considered as principal. The remainderman, who
is entitled to principal, cannot take under the statute which provides
that the one shall take who would take if the illegal direction had not
been given, because his interest, although vested, did not carry any
right to possession until the death of the life tenant, and the share
dividends must be presently distributed because they cannot be accumulated. The life tenant cannot take because she is entitled only to
income. Therefore, since the provision is in the residuary clause,
there is an intestacy as to the share dividends as principal and they
should be awarded to the h-eirs at law.
If the question in Mars's Estate is examined from another side.
a third result might be reached. Deleting the illegal direction, the
share dividends became presently distributable as principal. Since the
remainderman was given the principal under the will, his interest
might be found to have taken effect in immediate possession as to
principal when it became distributable. Therefore, under the statute, the share dividends should have been awarded to the remainderman. This would seem to be the best result since it awards the share
dividends as principal to the person the testator designated as the
recipient.
P.B.D.

DISPLACEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES BY STATUTES OF
THE
EQUITABLE RU L EOF
LIMITATIONS-CRYSTALLIZATION
Whether it be contended that equity supplements,' modifies 2 or con2 The following cases were relied upon by the lower court in Maris's Estate;
Edward's Estate, i9o Pa. 177, 42 Atl. 469 (1899) (income of life tenant expressly limited) ; Neel's Estate, 252 Pa. 394, 97 Atl. 502 (I916) (income of life
tenant expressly limited and no right of possession at the time of distribution in
the residuary legatees); Billing's Estate, 268 Pa. 71, IIo Atl. 768 (192o) (no
specific gift of income and no right of possession at the time of the distribution
in the residuary legatees).

'Langdell, Glassification.of Rights and Wrrongs (19oo) 13 HARV. L. REV.

659, 673.

Book Review (1912)

12 CCL L. REv. 756.
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flicts 3 with the law (in the narrow sense), it is generally conceded
that the fundamental purpose of equity was the reasonable modification of existing law and discretionary interference with the operation
of general rules in order to do justice.4 An examination of the
technique employed to determine whether the passage of a given
period of time has barred a cause of action affords a classical illustration of the essential difference between the two systems.
Statutes of limitations are those legislative enactments which
prescribe the period of time after which certain actions cannot be
5
Thus the passage of a given
brought or certain rights enforced.
period of time will, without more, give the defendant an effective
plea in bar to an action at law. Courts reiterate that the question as
to whether a court of equity will invoke 6 the doctrine of laches as
a reason for refusing relief, does not depend as does the statute of
limitations on ascertaining whether a certain period of time has
elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circunstances of the particular case, the complainant's lack of diligence
7
So it has been
in prosecuting his suit has worked injury to another.
said that laches sounds in estoppel." The United States Supreme
Court I has stated that the reason on which the rule was based was:

'Hohfeld, Relations Between Equity and Law (913) i1 MICH. L. REv.
537; PHELPs, FALSTAFF AND EOUITY (i90i) 45; BEALE, TREATISE: ox CONICT
OF LAWS (1916) 151.
4
CLARK,

PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE

EQUITABLE JURISPRUDENCE (1850)

(1883)

373;

1

SPENCE,

HISTORY

OF

323.

Bl ComIm.* 3o6. The Statute of Limitations affects only the remedy
and does not extinguish the right. Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, i3o U. S.
693, 9 Sup. Ct. 69o (i889).
'Probably a majority of the courts hold that the defense of laches need not
be pleaded when the facts are disclosed by the bill. Richards v. Mackail, 124
U. S. 183, 8 Sup. Ct. 437 (1888) ; C. B. Fleet Co. v. Mobile Drug Co., 284 Fed.
813 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922). But there is strong authority which holds that defendant must plead laches so as to give the complainant a chance to excuse his
301, 113 N. E. 6o8 (1916) ; Bryant v. Bryant,
delay. Woodall v. Peden, 274 Ill.
178 N. C. 77, 100 S. E. 178 (919).
'Abraham v. Ordway, 158 U. S. 416, 15 Sup. Ct. 894 (1895); Kansas City
Southern Ry. v. May, et al., 2 Fed. (2d) 68o (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; Kaliopulus v.
Lumm, I55 Md. 30, 131 Atl. 44o (1928); Smith v. Sprague, 244 Mich.
577, 2 N. W. 207 (1928) ; Chase v. Chase, 2o R. I. 202, 37 Atl. 804 (1897) ;
Dry v. Rice, 147 Va. 331, 137 S. E. 473 (I927). There are cases which hold that
mere delay, if for a long enough period, will constitute laches. Blue v. Hazel
Atlas Glass Co., io6 W. Va. 642, 147 S. E. 22 (I929). But even here the change
of position can be usually found in the loss of testimony and greater difficulty
33

of proof.

I PomREoy, EQUITABLE REMEDIEs (I905) § 23.

'Hydraulic Power Co. of Niagara Falls v. Pettebone, Cataract Paper Co.,
i98 App. Div. 644, II N. Y. Supp. 12 (i92i) ; Elder et al. v. Western Mining
Co. et al., 237 Fed. 966 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) ; Bowe v. Provident Loan Corporation, I2O Wash. 574, 2o8 Pac. 22 (1922).
9It is interesting to note that laches is not imputed to the sovereign. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co. v. The United States, 250 U. S. 123, 39 Sup. Ct.
407 (i919) ; Board of Supervisors of Tazewell County v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., ii9 Va. 763, 91 S. E. 124 (1916). For a case where laches was imputed to
a representative of the sovereign see City of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh & W. Va.
Ry. Co., 283 Pa. i96, i28 Atl. 827 (1925).
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". .. not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to
enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which
may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court of equity finds that the
position of the parties has so changed that the equitable relief
cannot be afforded without doing injustice or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one
from the consequences of his own neglect." 10
When courts of equity provided a more flexible rule capable of
a more precise application to factual situations such courts were
only performing that function to which they owe their very existence, i. e., the reasonable modification of existing law. 11 But has
the evolution of this equitable doctrine, which permits a more careful
analysis, resulted in the more equitable determination of the case
presented, or has the doctrine been so influenced by the statutes of
limitation as to have in turn become an arbitrary rule?
It has been said that so long as courts of equity are dealing with
purely equitable rights they can, in all cases where not specifically
provided otherwise by statute,' 2 determine when a delay is such that
it shall be branded as laches, unhampered by what period is set out
in the statute of limitations. 13 An examination of the cases offered
in support of this statement 'illustrates the well-settled proposition
that where the cestui que trust of an express trust seeks to enforce
his rights against the trustee, time does not commence to run until
repudiation by the trustee and knowledge thereof by the cestui. Since
the possession of the trustee is deemed that of the cestui, there can
be no adverse possession for time to run upon until there is a repu" Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S.685, 698, 18 Sup.
Ct. 223, 228 (1897). See cases cited supra note 7.
' See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 4 at 373; SPENCER, op. cit. supra.note 4
at 323.

ISome statutes expressly apply to equitable as well as legal actions. AIl\.

§652.
A few states provide that the statutory limitation
shall only be applicable to equity in cases of concurrent jurisdiction. COLO.
ComP. LAws (1922) 64Ol; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemmingway 1927) § 2662.
'Noble v. Noble, 73 Cal. App. 504, 239 Pac. 5I (1925); Jones v. -enderboll, 149 Ind. 458, 49 N. E. 443 (1898) ; Carr v. Craig, 138 Iowa 526, 116 N. W.
720 (i9o8) ; Thorne v. Foley, 137 Mich. 649, IO0 N. W. 905 (1904) ; Pierce v.
Perry, I89 Mass. 332, 75 N. E. 734 (19o5); McClelland v. State, ioi Ohio St
There is a split on whether the statute of limitations
42, 127 N. E. 409 (1920).
applies to a resulting trust. Cases which hold the statute is to be applied, Buckel
CIVIL CODE (1923)

v. Auer, 68 Ind. App. 320, I2o N. E. 437 (192o); Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga.
374, 112 S. E. 724 (1922). Contra: Strickler v. Strickler, 92 Wcst Va. 183, 114

S. E. 524 (i22). The general view is that the statutes of limitations are applicable to constructive trusts. American Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. Fourth
National Bank, 205 Ala. 652, 88 So. 838 (1924); Lezinsky v. Mason Malt
Distilling Co., 95 Cal. 24o, 196 Pac. 884 (1921) ; Lumber Co. v. Van Gorder,
IO5 Misc. 704, 174 N. Y. Supp. 38 (1922).
Eq. 566, 305 Atl. 17 (1918).

Contra: Smith v. Balch, 89 N. J.

(

344

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

diation. This is not an example of the ability of equity to furnish a
more efficient remedy because of the flexibility of the doctrine of
laches, but an illustration of the rule that time does not run as against
the cestui.'4 Where the action is between a cestui and a third party,
the trustee having failed to bring the action within the statutory period, the cestui is barred.'
There is authority which holds that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, even in the absence of express statutory provision, courts of
equity can give no relief after that period of time dictated by the
statute.' 6 In these jurisdictions the only time that a question of laches
can arise is before the statutory period has run. These courts argue,
that even thought the statutes may not in express terms apply to
courts of equity, to disregard them would amount to a virtual repeal,
for parties by a change of form could avoid their effect. It would
seem that if such statutes were intended to control courts of equity
such intention would be expressly stipulated as indeed it is in some
jurisdictions. Since the statutes only go to the remedy and do not
affect the substantive right involved it seems that courts of equity
might well disregard the statutory period if the complainant could
meet the other prerequisites necessary for relief in courts of equity.
Many state courts and the federal courts hold that the period prescribed by the statute is only a factor, in that it will be used as a convenient yardstick by which courts of equity may determine whether a
dilatory complainant shall be deemed guilty of laches. A much-cited
federal judge stated that the effect of the statute was to-raise a presumption:
"When a suit is brought within the time fixed by the analogous statute, the burden is on the defendant to show either from
the face of the bill or by his answer, that extraordinary circumstances exist which require the application of the doctrine of
laches; and, when such a suit is brought after the statutory time
has elapsed, the burden is on the complainant to show by suitable
averments in his bill, that it would be inequitable to apply it to
his case." 1
'Packer v. Overton, 20o Iowa 620, 2o3 N. W. 307 (1925); Morgner v.
Huning, 232 S. W. 88 (Mo. 192I); Hall v. Savings Bank, 97 Vt. 125, 124 At.
593 (1923).
Patchett v. Pac. Ry. Co., Ioo Cal. 5o5, 135 Pac. 73 (1893) ; Waterman
v. Waterman Hall, 22o Ill. 569, 77 N. E. 142 (19o6); Clayton v. Cagle, 97
N. C. 300, 1 S. E. 523 (1887).
"International Paper Co. v. Commonwealth, 232 Mass. 7, 121 N. E. 510
(i919); Minion v. Warner, 238 N. Y. 413, 144 N. E. 665 (x924); Hotchkin v.
McNaught Collins Improvement Co., 502 Wash. 161, 172 Pac. 864 (918).
'Kelly v. Boettcher, 85 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898).-

NOTES

It would seem that if the courts of equity are not bound by the
statute there is little reason for indulgence in this limiting presumption. It is submitted that since the doctrine does permit each case to
be determined on its own particular facts and since the doctrine of
laches is but an application of the broader maxims of equity, "He
who seeks equity must do equity" and "He who comes into equity
must come with clean hands," Is whether or not the statutory period
has run should only be a factor in considering whether the mere lapse
of time has obscured the evidence on which the defendant predicates
his defense. But, regardless of whether this presumption is consonant with the basic principles of flexibility and fairness which gave
the germ of life to and nurtured equity through its early days, the
fact remains that this presumption is an integral part of the administration of equity today. What circumstances then are necessary to
rebut this presumption? Since it takes a more virile court to allow
an action after that period when the corresponding action at law is
barred absolutely, than it does to refuse a complainant relief in equity
while he still may maintain an action at law, those cases where relief
was allowed after the statutory bar had arisen will be first considered.
Text-writers state that equity will act to support a worthy cause
after the statutory period has passed, and support this proposition
with a mass of dicta of similar tenor. 19 An examination of the instances where relief was actually granted under such circumstances
will reveal that such cases were almost without exception those where
fraud was present. Indeed, a federal court has stated that fraud
would be the only circumstances that would exempt the complainant
from the statutory bar.2 0 Relief in this type of case is not demonstrative of equity's furnishing more "equitable relief" in the moral
sense, for it is generally provided by statute 21 that where the cause of
action is fraudulently concealed, or where it arises from
fraud, time
22
shall not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.
"' Since laches does work on a sort of estoppel, it has been demonstrated that
the doctrine fits into the broader maxims of equity. i POME:ROY, op. Cit. sifpra,
note 7 (1905) § 21.
I PoiiR.,oy, op. cit. supra note 7, § 20; BISPHAM, EQUITY (gth ed.) (1915)
§260; CLARK, EQUITY (1928) §31.
- Chiswell v. Johnston, 299 Fed. 681, 688 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1924).
-' CoxN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 6175; GA. AxN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 438o;
ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927), c. 83, §23; MD. Awx. CoDE (Bagby, 1924)
Art. 57, § 14; MICH. Comp. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) § 12,330. Statutes differ in terminology as to whether time begins to run only after the actual discovery of the
fraud, or from that time when by the use of reasonable diligence the fraud would
have been discovered.
"Walker Lucas-Hudson Oil Co. v. Hudson, 168 Ark. 1098 272 S. W. 836
(r925) ; Gailey v. Wilkinsburg Real Estate & Trust Co., 283 Pa. 381, 129 At.
445 (1925).
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Only after a search which leads to the last bulwarks can a line
of cases be found where this doctrine, so efficacious in permitting a
chancellor to decide each case on its own merits, is effectively employed, and cases legion can be found where equitable relief was refused before the statutory period had run. An enumeration of all those
particular circumstances which have been considered such as to warrant the denial of equitable relief is beyond the purpose of this note.
There is one situation, however, where the consistent refusal of the
courts to grant the relief sought is conspicuous because of the short
interval of time that had elapsed between the wrong complained of
and the relief asked. Where the right to be enforced, or the property
recovered, has greatly increased in value, courts are loath to act, unless the prayer for relief is made immediately.2
With the exception of those cases where the increment is a direct result of the acts
of the defendant, or of third parties, 4 it would seem that the increase
in value of the subject matter should be a reason which would impel
the courts to refuse to permit the defendant to retain the products of
his wrongful acts.2 5 Another and a more fundamental objection to
the isolation of a group of cases, and the application of a general
rule to all cases that fall into that particular category, is that this is
an abdication of the power to discriminate and the substitution in its
place of an arbitrary system of case law. So even in that group of
cases where laches is applied independently of statutory limitations,
the doctrine is tending to lose its elasticity.
In conclusion, the suggestion is offered, that the crystallization
of laches is not a unique example of the decomposition of a single
branch of equity, but a symptom of the disintegration of the whole
equitable system. .' O It has been said that this crystallization is a result of our system of case law; that our social and economic conditions make it obligatory that such a system be used; that, since the
trend is but a manifestation of an inherent quality of our equitable

'Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S. 309, 25 Sup. Ct. 35 (904); Mason v.
McFadden, 298 Fed. 384 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924). See McIntyre v. Pryor, 173 U. S.
38, 19 Sup. Ct. 352 (1898).
"Jackson v. Jackson, 175 Fed. 710 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909); Sagandahoc Oil
Co. v. Ewing, 65 Fed. 702 (C. C. A. 6th, T895) ; Great West Mining Co. v.
Alston Mining Co., 14 Colo. 90, 23 Pac. 908 (189o) ; Williams v. Rhodes, 81 Il1.
571 (1876) ; Union Oil & Gas v. Cross, 22o Ky. 271, 295 S. W. 172 (1926).
This tendency of the courts to impute laches when the subject matter of
the suit is of a highly specuiative- nature seems to have no basis on either logia
or morality. Since by hypothesis neither the defendant nor the complainant
have caused the increase in value, the result of refusing the complainant relief
is to premiumize the defendant's wrongful act. i Po.mROY, op. cit. sIpra note
7, § 23.

' Pound, Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 Coj_ L. REv. --o.
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system, the result is inevitable that equity as we know it today must
disappear.2 7 If this prophecy prove correct, we are faced with the unhappy prospect of a fixed legal system where the reasonable modification of28existing law will be impossible other than by legislative
enactment.
D. L.
- Dnu.o,, LAwS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AmEmCA (i8%5) 387.
'See CLARK, op. cit. szpra note 4 at 373; SPENCE, op. cit. supra note 4 at

323; Pound, op. cit. supra note "26.

